government and law (the author's answer is no).
1 The history of the patriarchs and matriarchs from the book of Genesis address the nature, source and legitimacy of power in families. In the first fourteen chapters of the book of Exodus, the author demonstrates that political organization is the only feasible means for governing groups of substantial size; argues that nationhood is preferable to nomadism, dependency, and slavery as a form of political organization; and identifies self-governance, law, and control over territory as the essential attributes of nationhood. The Israelites achieve self-governance in the struggle with Pharaoh and the escape at the Sea of Reeds. The narrative of Mount
Sinai provides the author with a frame within which to examine the second fundamental attribute of nationhood, namely the establishment of legal institutions.
The Importance of Sinai
Few would dispute that the revelation on Sinai is a central event in the biblical narrative. It is here that the author explores in greatest detail the concepts of revelation and consent as justifications for political authority. And it is here that God establishes the law that will govern the people of Israel-not only the written law as recorded in the Bible but also, in Jewish tradition, the unwritten law that God gave to Moses orally and that the sages developed in the Talmud.
The author signals the centrality of Sinai by its location in the structure of tradition extending from the beginning of the book of Exodus to the end of book of Joshua. 2 This body of narrative takes the form of a chiasmus (a figure of speech, common in biblical and other ancient literature, in which a point is developed through parallel elements on either side of a central motif). 3 The Israelites begin in slavery, engage in conflict with the people of the land, pass over a body of water that miraculously parts for them, wander in the wilderness, receive the law on a sacred mountain, wander in the wilderness, pass over a body of water that miraculously parts for them, engage in conflict with the people of the land, and wind up in freedom. The chiasmus takes the following form:
A. Enslavement B . Conflict with the people of the land C. Departure from the land D. Miraculous passage over a body of water E. Wandering in the wilderness F. Receipt of the law E'. Wandering in the wilderness D'. Miraculous passage over a body of water C'. Entry into the land B.' Conflict with the people of the land A'. Freedom
The central element of this chiasmus-and therefore the matter that the author most wishes to emphasize-is the giving of the law to the Israelites on Mount Sinai. The author, accordingly, has structured his account in such a way as to highlight and emphasize the Sinai episode as the defining moment of the history recounted in these texts.
Recent scholarship has recognized yet another way in which the author stresses the centrality of the events at Sinai. In the course of the narrative of the flight from Egypt and the theophany at Sinai, the author frequently interposes imagery associated with narratives, the Pentateuchal traditions have been arranged under a clear pattern which holds this unusual work together and makes it clear that the individual books-and among them Exodus-are just members of a greater whole"). 3 See Adele Berlin, The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985) . cultic observances. The book of Exodus is explicit on this point: Moses demands that the Israelites be allowed to depart so that they can perform sacrifices in the desert (Exod 3:18; 5:3; 8:27) . The time period Moses requests for the voyage to the sacrificial placethree days-is a conventional time for pilgrimage journeys (cf. Gen 22:4). As Mark S.
Smith and Elizabeth Bloch-Smith observe, the literary pattern of the book of Exodus is that of pilgrimage-the sacred journey to the temple and the prayers and sacrifices that ensue-giving the entire book a "cultic sensibility." 4 The chiastic structure noted above suggests an extension of this pilgrimage pattern. The institution of pilgrimage involves not only a voyage to a shrine or sacred spot; it also requires a return from the destination.
The same families and groups who mustered in the outlands to travel to the shrine would travel home afterward, usually together. Chaucer's Canterbury Tales provides an analogy: it contemplates that each pilgrim would tell two tales on the way to Canterbury and also two tales on the way back. The fellowship was not going to disperse after the visit to the shrine. Likewise the Israelites in the book of Exodus do not disperse after the theophany at Sinai; they continue on their wanderings and separate only after their (partial) conquest of the promised land. The chiastic structure of the books of Exodus through Joshua suggests that the back end of the story-the Israelites' journey from Sinai to the promised land-is also part of the pilgrimage pattern in these books. In the biblical story, of course, unlike the Canterbury Tales, the travelers do not return home to their starting place but rather continue on to a new home. But symbolically the cases are parallel. The condition of the Israelites in Egypt can be characterized as one of living in a spiritually (and physically) oppressed condition; the giving of the law at Sinai represents the liberation of the spirit that is achieved at the pilgrimage shrine; and the journey to the promised land equates with the return voyage of the pilgrims relieved of spiritual burdens. Egypt and the promised land, in this pattern, are two versions of the same place:
the difference is that at the beginning the subjects are oppressed and at the end they are liberated.
The author achieves multiple purposes by associating the exodus story with Why does the author make the Sinai narrative the watershed of this mass of tradition? From the standpoint of political theory, the implication is that the work done at
Sinai-the reception of law-is more significant than the other fundamental attributes of nationhood. The reason for this priority may have to do with the fact that even though all three attributes are fundamental, the legal institutions of government tend to be more salient once a nation has been established. In the absence of a crisis, both self-governance and territory tend to be taken for granted; but the operation of government-the day-today administration of the laws and the ebb and flow of political power through which tose laws are exercised-are of continuing and immediate relevance to the people. For this reason, the analysis of the institutions of government and law is at the forefront of the author's attention.
The Rule of Law
The author uses the Sinai narrative to make several observations about the legitimacy of law in general. These considerations are today discussed under the rubric of the "rule of law"-a term of uncertain scope that refers generally to the "regular and impartial administration of public rules." 6 Any just political system, it is said, should administer its laws according to the requirements of the rule of law. The Sinai narrative codes certain elements that can be understood from a modern perspective as implementing rule-of-law values.
1. The rule of law suggests that unless there is a good reason to make exceptions, laws should apply equally to all persons similarly situated. 7 The author codes this principle with the fact that God announces the law from the top of a mountain-a detail that symbolizes generality through its line-of-sight attributes. Because the mountaintop is elevated, it is in the line of sight of the foot of the mountain where the Israelites are assembled (the author deals with the problem that people should not also see God by wreathing the peak in cloud. The laws announced by God are applicable to all the Israelites, not just a few; and they apply in the same way to all those similarly situated.
2. The rule of law also suggests that laws should be public. In this way people can understand and comply with them. The author codes this principle with the detail that God speaks the law to all the people. This creates a bit of difficulty because it may confer too much political authority on the people; the author deals with this problem by making
God's voice sound to the people like trumpet blasts or thunder and providing Moses as translator.
3. Another rule-of-law value is that laws should not fluctuate over time. This desideratum is coded in the fact that the law is announced by God and God does not readily change his mind. For the Decalogue in particular, the quality of stability is coded in the details of the tablets discussed above-the fact that the Ten Commandments are engraved in stone, which is durable and hard to alter.
Legal Institutions
The author portrays the Israelites adopting five types of legal institutions in the 
Basic Commitment
Although people often think of constitutions as the most basic of legal principles, they are not. Underlying every constitution is something more fundamental: the commitment of the people to become and remain organized as a nation. This basic commitment is the "I do" of government: the act of the people in casting their lot together in a common enterprise-an enterprise that is not temporary but permanent, not based on expediency but on principle; undertaken not lightly but with full awareness of the gravity of the act. It is this basic commitment to nationhood that underlies genuine love of country, that motivates men and women to sacrifice their lives in the defense of their fellow citizens, and that induces people to accept outcomes they detest-whether they be laws, taxes, or political leaders-because they have made an allegiance to something more permanent and lasting. The basic commitment must be made at the time a nation is formed; it is also something that citizens of a nation experience as a lived reality, one that they may not consciously think of often but that serves as a constant guide for their conduct as citizens.
Because it is so fundamental, the basic commitment is rarely stated explicitly. But at times of national stress-in moments where the identity of political institutions is in flux-the commitment may appear in verbal form. The U.S. Declaration of Independence, adopted in 1776 at a moment of crisis between the thirteen colonies and Great Britain, is concerned with this issue. 8 Jefferson's text proclaims a basic commitment to the new nation in the following words: "We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America … do … solemnly publish and declare, that these united colonies are, and of right ought to be free and independent states; that … they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do." In words sublimely expressing the existential step involved, the declaration concludes, "and for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor."
The setup of the book of Exodus provides a frame for the analysis of the basic commitment. During the voyage to Sinai the Israelites enjoy self-governance under the leadership of Moses but have made no lasting or binding commitment to nationhood. It was convenient and possibly necessary for them to participate in the exodus; if they had stayed behind they would have faced enslavement or worse. They have remained together in the wilderness, but again they had little alternative. At least when trekking under
Moses' guidance they receive manna to eat and water to drink; if they head out on their own, they will starve or die of thirst. They have not been tested in battle-the defeat of the Egyptian chariot force was due to God's grace, not to any courageous acts by the Israelites. They have experienced individual hardship but have not sacrificed for one another; their repeated complaints about their personal suffering indicate that they have little concern for the welfare of the community as a whole. Prior to the covenant at Sinai, in short, there is nothing to stop the people from dropping out if a better alternative presents itself. A natural question about the basic commitment is whether it is made for all time or is conditional on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of certain events. The U.S.
Declaration of Independence takes the latter view with respect to the British Crown, asserting that the ties that bound the people to Great Britain were conditional and that those obligations were no longer effective when the British king broke the rules. 10 The 9 Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 17. 10 The first sentence of the declaration acknowledges that the colonies are severing the "political bands which have connected" them with Great Britain and assuming "among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them." Left unsettled was whether the basic commitment to the United States was also conditional-an ambiguity that would erupt into violence nearly a century later when the southern states sought to dissolve the political ties that bound them to the Union. Several Confederate states promulgated their own declarations of independence over the issue of slavery: Georgia's stated that "we resume the powers which our fathers delegated to the Government of the United States, and henceforth will seek new safeguards for our liberty, equality, security, and tranquility." Georgia Official Records, Series IV, Vol. 1, 81-85. President Lincoln rejected the claim that Bible takes a different view. The pledge made by the Israelites at Sinai is not conditional.
There are no circumstances in which the Israelites could legitimately seek to dissolve the political bonds that they assumed at Sinai.
Rule of Recognition
The legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart identified a rule of recognition as the standard that legal systems employ to identify the scope of primary rules. 11 It is the "master rule"
that assigns the authority to make law. 12 Hart's specific position on this issue is controversial, but all that need concern us here is the idea that the efficacy of any legal system depends on norms for recognizing when something is or is not law. in that it is composed entirely of apodictic rules-you shall not murder, you shall not steal, you shall not misuse the name of the Lord, and so on. The rest of the Bible's legal corpus is a mixture of apodictic and casuistic rules. One feature of apodictic rules is their generality. 18 The apodictic phrasing implies greater generality-and thus a more fundamental subject matter for decision. 16 It is perhaps for this reason that the rules of the Decalogue are phrased in personal terms. They are directed at the individual who hears them: "you shall have no other gods before me"; "you shall not misuse the name of the Lord." Other legal rules are often impersonal in address: thus the Bible sets forth rules on what happens when "anyone" strikes a man and kills him (Exod 2:12) or "anyone" beats a slave (Exod 21:20) . 17 Albrecht Alt, "The Origins of Israelite Law," in Essays on Old Testament History and Religion, For this reason, they are the type of rules that are set forth by higher courts rather than trial courts. The U.S. Supreme Court is fond of phrasing rules this way because it views its job largely as that of setting principles for the lower courts to follow.
Constitutions identify the basic institutions of government and define their
responsibilities. The author codes this idea in the detail of the two tablets. 19 Why are there two tablets, and what words are written on each? It would be natural to think that God divided the commandments in half, five on one tablet and five on another; but this would lead to a lopsided result because there are more words in the first five. For aesthetic reasons, if nothing else, it seems preferable to think that Moses came down the mountain with symmetrical tablets. Another alternative is to divide the commandments by subject: commentators have noted that the first four commandments concern relationships between man and god whereas the last six concern relations of human beings to one another. Dividing the commandments this way has the added benefit of improving the symmetry of the two tablets by establishing a somewhat more equal distribution of words.
A more basic question, however, is why there were two tablets at all. At 172 words, the Decalogue is not so lengthy that the whole text could not have been placed on one tablet. Other ancient Near Eastern texts are inscribed on a single stone. Perhaps God wanted two tablets to make it easier for Moses to lug the stones up and down the mountain, but it is not clear that two would be better than one in this respect. The most commonly accepted explanation for the use of two tablets is that God was marking a distinction in subject matter: either marking the difference between rules governing relations between man and god and rules governing relations between man and man, as in the conventional account, or, in Calum Carmichael's view, distinguishing between judgments formulated from a scrutiny of the story of the golden calf and those derived from Genesis stories. 20 Yet these theories do not explain why God considered the distinctions so important as to require two tablets: why couldn't he have indicated a change of topic more parsimoniously through some marking on a single stone?
An explanation that responds to this latter difficulty is that the entire text of the Decalogue was written on each tablet with a copy for each of the contracting parties.
21
According to this explanation the tablets are fabricated not for the purpose of distinguishing along subject-matter lines but rather to provide further assurance of authenticity. XVII 8-16," in Congress Volume, Edinburgh (VTSup 28; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 29-41. the bureaucracy (Hur). 23 The story 
Legislation
The Sinai narrative contains a large corpus of ordinary law-laws other than the constitutional rules propounded in the Decalogue. Ordinary law, like the constitutional rules in the Decalogue, divides between rules pertinent to civil administration and those pertaining to religious matters. Although there is some intermixture between civil and religious rules, 24 the author takes pains to separate the spheres.
1. Looking at the rules of civil law, we can observe that they are surprisingly incomplete. They cover some topics but omit others that one would expect to see in a well-functioning legal code (rules on contracts, for example, are nearly absent even though people in biblical days made contracts with one another and needed legal rules to interpret and enforce their agreements). 25 The incompleteness of the law is in striking contrast with evidence of a vibrant legal culture in biblical times. 26 God, trustworthy men who hate dishonest gain-and appoint them as officials over thousands, hundreds, fifties and tens. Have them serve as judges for the people at all times, but have them bring every difficult case to you; the simple cases they can decide themselves. That will make your load lighter, because they will share it with you. If you do this and God so commands, you will be able to stand the strain, and all these people will go home satisfied" . Moses agrees with his father-in-law's advice and implements the proposal.
A noteworthy feature of this episode is that Moses undertakes an action that has some of the attributes of law: he establishes inferior courts and sets forth rules defining their jurisdiction. Yet this action does not satisfy the rule of recognition: it is not a rule given by God to Moses during the wilderness wanderings. 30 This detail is deliberate. It recognizes the law-like character of administrative regulations-hence the adoption of these rules in the wilderness very near to Mount Sinai. But it also gives rulers the authority to make subsidiary rules for the administration of government without having to insert these rules into the narrative of God's commands-and indeed to rely on foreign sources. 31 The narrative thus codes a discretionary authority to enact rules governing 30 See Watts, Reading Law, 105. 31 See Levinson, "Deuteronomy's Conception of Law," 63. As Levinson observes, Deut 1:9-17 retracts this concession by claiming that the organization of the judiciary was solely Moses' idea.
